The Generous Object: The Relational and the Aesthetic in Contemporary Art

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Every artwork is a form of social address, in the sense that it always assumes it has a public: a group of people viewing it, listening to it, reading it. But what are the social relationships that make up art and that art makes up, and how are these relationships related to each of our own individual, subjective experiences of the way things look, sound, and feel? As the field of socially engaged practice elicits tentative and contested self-definitions, it is crucial to hold these questions open.

In his book *Relational Aesthetics*, published in French in 1998 and in English in 2002, curator Nicolas Bourriaud defines Relational art as one that takes “as its theoretical horizon the sphere of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an autonomous and private symbolic space.” Bourriaud’s writings were crucial to establishing and defining Relational art as a discipline. Although it inhabited a historically specific moment, his account continues to impact the way socially engaged art is conceived and institutionalized. Because of his continuing influence on contemporary art production and display, there is a clear need to look at what Bourriaud excludes and assumes as he aims to voice the patterns and possibilities of the art of the 1990s.
theanyspacewhatever, an exhibition that opened in 2008 at the Guggenheim Museum in New York, aimed to “capture the spirit of the art that emerged during the early 1990s” by inviting Relational artists to produce new works for the site. The 10 selected artists—Angela Bulloch, Maurizio Cattelan, Liam Gillick, Dominique Gonzalez-Foerster, Douglas Gordon, Carsten Höller, Pierre Huyghe, Jorge Pardo, Philippe Parreno, and Rirkrit Tiravanija—first showed together in Bourriaud’s 1996 exhibition Traffic at CAPC in Bordeaux, France. theanyspacewhatever did not contextualize, document, or re-create, nor did the museum dictate that the 10 artists must present “Relational” artworks. Nevertheless, most critics expected that the terms of engagement would be the same ones Bourriaud had outlined—that it would be a show about convivial social space, direct engagement between viewers and artists. They assumed that visitors would become part of a network of participants who would not only share the same space, but also move through it with a heightened awareness of their mutual relationships.

The common thread among the practices of the selected artists, according to the Guggenheim, was that “they privilege experiential, situation-based work over discrete aesthetic objects.” The implication is that discreteness connotes disengagement and detachment, as opposed to the kind of direct engagement offered by Relational art. Experiential work is extolled as situation-based, and at odds with aesthetics and/or objects. Bourriaud made these same conflations. But should direct engagement really be valorized over subjective reflection? Is the discrete truly at odds with the experiential? Is aesthetics concerned only with objects, and not experiences?

My experience of theanyspacewhatever was not dynamic or transformative. It felt heavy, alienating. I sat shoeless on a flat white pillow on a small expanse of orange carpet, listening on headphones to one Relational artist after another CHEW THE FAT with Rirkrit Tiravanija. I felt like I was being let in on a secret, but after almost an hour of dutiful listening, I put my shoes back on and left the room feeling a bit more informed, but
still entirely outside the club. I walked up the Guggenheim’s round, winding ramp, weaving around Jorge Pardo’s laser-cut partitions, which forced my path into preprogrammed S-curves.

Many of the artists in theanyspacewhatever seemed to be grappling with an analogous sense of restricted movement. Philippe Parreno’s audio guide for the show was voiced by World Memory Champion Boris Konrad (who, true to form, recited the script entirely from memory). The tour described the best-known works by each artist, rather than the pieces actually on view. It pointed to the constructed and historically contingent aspect of the grouping, the preoccupation with the artists’ iconic works, which brand them as “Relational” and bind them together. Parreno’s audio guide was a metonym for the Guggenheim exhibition itself. It was a practice in recitation, a reiteration of something past, made to inhabit current space and time.

In a 2010 essay, Guggenheim chief curator Nancy Spector acknowledged both the importance of Relational Aesthetics at the time it was published and its narrowness as a theoretical construct for framing contemporary work. She cites the discrepancy between Bourriaud’s framework and the actual work on view as one of the factors that caused theanyspacewhatever to fall short of expectations: “The exhibition . . . was a failure—a beautiful, perfect failure—that illuminated the disjunction between the theoretical apparatus associated with the art on view and the actual practices represented.”4 The overwhelmingly negative critical response to theanyspacewhatever was not because of fundamental weaknesses in the artists’ practices, nor was it entirely the fault of the institution that the works felt hollow in the Guggenheim’s rotunda. Rather, it emerged from the impossible expectation that the work would be inherently transformative, that it automatically had the power to create meaningful, revelatory social relations, regardless of context. As Spector acknowledged, the show revealed the rigidity of Relational Aesthetics as a category for naming and thinking about contemporary practices. It also underlined the importance of the specific conditions in which a work is encountered in considering the kinds of relations it might propose.
To conceive of Relational art as a discipline or genre distinct from other ways of art making is inherently problematic. Artists across many fields share the desire to engage with publics. The rigidity or openness with which we define the social in art is an aesthetic question, one that deals with the overlap between production and consumption, activity and passivity, making and interpreting. To reinvigorate a place for aesthetics in Relational Aesthetics, to sharpen and extend the dialogue about social engagement in art, requires a critique of Bourriaud’s foundational premises. It also requires a reexamination of the word aesthetic in order to arrive at an understanding of the ways in which the word has functioned as part of this discourse, and the role it can continue to play in conversations about socially engaged art.

Bourriaud makes three major presuppositions. The first is an exclusion suggested in the definition of Relational art—that it “taking as its theoretical horizon the sphere of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an autonomous and private symbolic space.”5 The assumption is that a private symbolic space is not a social one. But aesthetic experiences, which are subjective, specific, and individual, are in fact already social. The call for direct social engagement in art comes out of Bourriaud’s characterization of the public as essentially alienated and passive. This diagnosis is linked to his second assumption, that a Relational work creates a network “whose progression in time and space [the artist] controls.”6 In this conception, publics do not form themselves around a work, but are called into being by the artist, who controls their movements through space and time, removing self-determination from the act of viewership. Bourriaud’s third assumption, that Relational work constitutes a new avant-garde, emerges from the first two. In his recent article “Precarious Constructions,” he asserts that “truly innovative Relational practices” base themselves on “the precarious state,” which is a literal flickering or intermittence, a quick intervention into ordinary, alienated experience.7 This so-called precarious work “disposes its effects, and then withdraws.”8 The assertion that this particular kind of practice, intervention with effect, is the truly innovative Relational artwork implies that other contemporary practices that do not fit these precise criteria are either not truly Relational or not truly innovative. When Relational Aesthetics becomes a category, Relational Aesthetics stops being an aesthetic text. It stops being a discursive means of investigating the social relationships artworks propose, and becomes a means of sorting artworks based on supposedly inherent characteristics.

The literal articulation of a social turn in art was a stage in the development of Relational Aesthetics; the field needed to define its terms before they could be questioned, and before they could be applied more broadly. Now that a canon is
taking shape, oversimplification becomes a potential hazard. A definition can function as a manifesto—an assertion of an “ought” rather than an “is.” Definition is not only descriptive, but also normative, prescriptive. It not only attempts to articulate the complexity of conditions already present, but also aims to assert a new cohesive direction, a model, which inevitably leaves some kinds of existing and future production outside of the discourse. The space inside functions as an incubator—a sturdy architecture within which practices can fit and be understood. But the strongest aspect of Relational projects, one might argue, stems from an opposite impulse: the desire to involve a public in an unresolved, open, and sometimes confusing relationship. Through constrictive definition, the discourse that seeks to describe these practices can have an adverse influence on them, nudging them toward increased rigidity—simple shelters that nest into critical structures, small rooms that restrict the very movement socially driven artworks hope to invite and interrogate.

What Bourriaud wanted from art is something I and many other viewers also want: We want art to be aware of its social context, and for it to offer a conversation rather than a monologue. But this quality is not contained within an artwork; it only comes into being when the artwork exists in relation to a viewer. It is an attribute not of the object itself, but of a person’s aesthetic experience (via an exhibition, an intervention, an installation, et cetera). What counts as social investigation in art must be reexamined in order to make room for the varied practices that have developed since Relational Aesthetics, many of which don’t look Relational at all but still pose potent questions about what it means to be individual subjects, bound up with one another.

Because of the complex dynamic between the subjective and the social in an aesthetic experience, a discussion of aesthetics is key to the project of undoing the boundary between Relational art and non–Relational art. Immanuel Kant describes the aesthetic experience as a subjective feeling in which a viewer’s imagination and understanding are irresolvably intertwined. In ordinary experience, imagination is subordinate to understanding. Your imagination presents cohesive images of objects to your cognition, which identifies them and subsumes them into categories. In aesthetic experience, these faculties—imagination and understanding—exist in a state of mutual stimulation, what Kant calls “free play.” This experience is pleasurable because it is irresolute, not easily categorized. You then extrapolate from this feeling to include other people in your thought process, and this is often where the real pleasure is: You think, other people will feel what I feel when they come into contact with this thing. This experience is active and passive, subjective and social, productive and receptive.
In an aesthetic judgment, there is a reciprocal relationship between the subjective and the universal. Kant writes:

*The quickening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the given representation, harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition generally, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgment of taste.*

What Kant calls “universal communicability” does not involve the imposition of one’s judgment of taste on other viewers, or the assumption that the aesthetic experience will be the same for everyone. On the contrary, there is also pleasure in the understanding that each interpretation (including the artist’s) is just one of the endless possible iterations of a project, and that each person’s interpretation is significant partly because of this variation and difference. The part of this sensation that constitutes an aesthetic judgment is not simply physical or cognitive pleasure. It is the feeling that the excitement is shareable. This social moment within a subjective experience is essential to aesthetics.

Jacques Rancière offers a second useful framework for consideration. In his recent writings he expands upon Kant’s ideas, taking up the irresolvable relationship between the mind and the senses. In his terms, the aesthetic regime is an open arena of contestation in which the current distributions of space and time can be reshuffled. The aesthetic requires a suspension of the rules that govern the ways people move through the world, “a redistribution of the relations between the forms of sensory experience.” This involves a rupture in the ordinary ways of categorizing events and encounters: as work or leisure, as productive or receptive, as private or social. The social in art cannot be separated from aesthetics, or from subjective experience. These categories bleed into one another every time any artwork reaches a public.

Both Kant and Rancière think of aesthetics as a space of open, unresolved reflection in which the usual ways of perceiving space and time can be remade. Aesthetics, as I will use the word, is a way of recognizing the production inherent in reception, and a means of making visible the ways publics form. It is an approach to the production of artworks, and to looking at them—a mode of thinking about the structure of art in its production, and a way of creating a discourse about the kind of production a work posits as possible in its reception.

A work that is in conversation with its public need not take the form of a convivial space. Many contemporary art practices make visible the inherently social aspect of viewing by foregrounding each viewer’s process of construction: the activity and passivity that take place in an individual, subjective, aesthetic experience. They
are not usually described as socially engaged because they are not overtly collaborative, or convivial. In some cases, however, the relationships they propose among artist, viewer, artwork, and institution are more malleable than those proposed by works that fit neatly (although problematically) into the rubric of Relational art by organizing their publics into roles and narrowly defining “participation.” Artworks that propose aesthetic spaces acknowledge the agency and intelligence of their viewers. When we consider a work aesthetically, we look for the kind of invitation it proposes to a public, which will form around the space it opens. We rehearse a way of looking that is able to address the changing, expanding field, that is able to consider the social relations present in the broadest possible range of practices, without creating new limitations.

The ability of a work to open a social, aesthetic space is a quality not of the object, but of an experience, which happens between the object and a person who comes into contact with it. Artworks cannot be aesthetic or social in and of themselves. The following case study is not a model for a new or exemplary socially engaged work. Instead, it illustrates aesthetic ambiguity, a space in which individual subjectivities can struggle without the aim of resolution.

The footnotes of this essay appear in one of Paul Chan’s 11 Alternumerics fonts, which can be downloaded for free from his website, nationalphilistine.com. In one, The Future Must Be Sweet—After Fourier (2001), each typed letter is comprised of a map of words. It is based on a system of key-for-key substitutions:

An A types like (alternatives), a b like (a gingerly), a period like this

If you download this font and use it on your computer, as you type, each of your letters is transformed into a small system of words that connects by way of open-ended lines to the ones above, beside, and below it. The words that replace your letters are based on the philosophy of Charles Fourier, a utopian socialist who, according to Chan, “believed everyone should have equal access to justice, affection, and fine foods.” As a person types, a diagram is produced that takes (invented) fragments of Fourier’s thought and arranges them into what Chan calls a multilinear narrative. Or, a:
It is multilinear because there is no assumption that it will be read in any particular order. There is also no way to prescribe that the connections between words signified by dashes will be translated the same way by any two readers. Because this work evades institutional context, and because there is no singular illustration of the font’s proper usage, there is no correct way to use or read it.

A viewer’s experience of this piece is most likely solitary. But its implications for communication are social. The typist/participant drives the production of the work, but his or her intended meanings quickly escape, absorbed into bits and pieces of a faux-utopian fiction. Chan conceived the plan for the project but has negligible control over its outcome, which can be infinitely and indefinitely reconfigured. In his 1977 essay “The Death of the Author” Roland Barthes wrote, “A text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, and contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author.”

Whereas Barthes saw in this mutability and multiplicity “a systematic exemption of meaning,” Chan’s project proffers an overabundance of content. Every time a participant types, more and more substance is generated.

Meaning can be manipulated within this system, but only to a point. As the font is used, meaning twists and escapes from both artist and participant. In doing so it also suggests the promise and the frustration of communication, and of aesthetic encounters. In rereading one’s own typed texts, meanings shift, interpretations become plural. Each relationship is allowed to slip, to make way for another idea that leads elsewhere. As the font continues to “spill,” it simultaneously undermines understanding and presents new possibilities for construction in the process of reading. This project does not presuppose that “objective transmission” is possible—that an idea can remain intact as it passes from the artist, through the work of art, to the viewer. Instead, it makes visible the multiplicity of meaning already present in every expression, every time a word is used. I can never assume that what I write will be interpreted by you in the way I intend. In using this font, the potential for translation and misapprehension that already generally exists in written or spoken dialogue is experienced by one person, who is positioned on both sides of the encounter. The
gap between cause and effect, between intended meaning and its manifestation on the page, creates the possibility of an aesthetic space.\textsuperscript{16}

Rancière asserts that spectators have a kind of collective power, but that it is not brought into being through direct engagement. The social moment in aesthetics is tied to an irreconcilable distance among people:

\textit{The collective power shared by spectators does not stem from the fact that they are members of a collective body or from some specific form of interactivity. It is the power each of them has to translate what she perceives in her own way, to link it to the unique intellectual adventure that makes her similar to all the rest in as much as this adventure is not like any other. This shared power of the equality of intelligence links individuals, makes them exchange their intellectual adventures, in so far as it keeps them separate from one another, equally capable of using the power everyone has to plot her own path.}\textsuperscript{17}

In other words, the discrepancies in the ways individuals make meaning is the very thing that bonds them. In \textit{Alternumerics} it is the apparent and performed explosion of intended sense, and the ability of each person who types it or sees it to construct more meaning out of the rubble, that makes evident the intelligence of each artist, viewer, typist, reader. A viewer becomes a writer by typing; the writer becomes a reader of the unrecognizable text he or she types. \textit{Alternumerics} brings to the fore the
agency in reflection, while not losing sight of the distance that is part of being bound up together.

Art is not only a topic of debate, but also a set of conditions that restricts or allows debate. The aesthetics of a work are closely related to the particular context in which it is encountered. An artwork does not just depict a world; it functions within one, and proposes another. A viewer’s experience of these worlds is mediated by context, and the aesthetics of a work cannot be considered without thinking about the conditions that frame a viewer’s interaction with it. For Bourriaud, an artwork’s structure allows it to be termed Relational, regardless of its institutional context. Institutions, however, mediate the conditions for viewership, and for relation. Relational works continue to be supported, but also suspended, in fraught relationships with the organizations that provide money for work to be made, and spaces for it to be shown. Galleries provide a context that asks for the objects within their walls to be considered closely, but they also exist within market conditions that tend to stifle complexity. They are open to the public but operate by maintaining a level of exclusivity. Galleries divide their publics into two distinct groups: clients (people in the market to purchase works), and visitors (people who look without the intent or the means to buy). Rirkrit Tiravanija’s piece *Untitled 1992 (Free)* deliberately intervened into this environment.

Tiravanija turned 303 Gallery in New York into a kitchen. He cooked Thai curry, and anyone who attended the opening ate for free. This work leveled the field: Clients and visitors were treated equally in a space that ordinarily treats them differently. Bourriaud argues that Rancière, in criticizing Relational work, fails to adequately consider it formally, and instead discusses it only as a social arrangement. Bourriaud asks, “What about the colours, the disposition of elements in space, the dialogue with the exhibition space, the formal structure of the installation, the protocol for its use?” But if we understand aesthetics as an open arena in which it is possible to challenge what is seeable, sayable, and doable, Tiravanija’s work can be considered aesthetically. Its aesthetic strength, however, does not lie in the “colors” (the appearance of the vegetables, the way the hotplates were arranged, the way the food tasted) or protocol (the rules it established for viewer participation), but in its ability, at the distinct place and time it was shown, to challenge what was perceptible as art, and to disrupt the gallery space’s usual assumptions regarding who is important and who is not.

The food was, in a sense, an object, something that could be consumed. But it could be consumed for free, by anyone who visited. The artwork—the experience of being present at the opening with other people, sharing a meal, and trying to figure out what made this meal art—was not directly translatable into capital.
The piece moved away from commercial exchange toward social interaction, but not solely via the gesture of providing a meal. The fact that this work can (still) be bought and sold confirms that its challenge is not inherent, but contingent. A private buyer who purchased a similar piece by Tiravanija, *Untitled (Pad See-ew)*, was given a coupon that could be redeemed for a meal cooked by the artist. This buyer never redeemed it, and instead donated the piece in 2000 to the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. In 2002, SFMOMA flew Tiravanija out from New York to cook dinner at an invitation-only gathering for trustees. Museum staff and visitors were not allowed to attend. When dinner was over, the dirty dishes and utensils were deposited into a vitrine, which was kept as documentation. The work’s aesthetic space was closed when it lost its power to disassemble existing hierarchies, and was used as a means of generating buzz for an exclusive set of guests in an exclusive space. Aesthetic content in a work is not inherent, but conditional. It changes based on who is showing the work, and who is looking.

Bourriaud understands Relational artists as essentially different from earlier generations of artists. They are part of the service industry (whereas Minimalist artists were part of “heavy industry”). This designation serves to situate
them at the cutting edge of contemporary practice by locating in them a particular set of characteristics. He writes:

*Tiravanija once quoted this sentence from Wittgenstein: “Don’t look for the meaning of things, look for their use.” One is not in front of an object anymore but included in the process of its construction.*

Works such as *Untitled 1992 (Free)* can be considered services, in that the artist fulfills a basic need for visitors by cooking food. But they also function aesthetically when they challenge the conventions of the spaces they inhabit so that the meaning of those spaces is altered and new ways of being in them can be conceived. Bourriaud’s reading of Wittgenstein in this passage is explicitly anti-aesthetic; contemplation and production are at odds. What Bourriaud ignores is that to be in front of an object is to construct it. His conception of the artwork as something concerned not with meanings but only with use bypasses the aesthetic experience, the viewer’s re-creation of the work that happens in the translation and production of its meanings. He focuses only on the viewer’s physical participation, and looks only for the effects of the artwork upon the viewer. This conception insists upon the viewer’s passivity, and assumes a simplistic causal relationship in the encounter. The artist creates work as a service to the viewer, who benefits from the artist’s intervention.

The quote by Wittgenstein, on the other hand, offers an alternative to simplistic causal reasoning. His focus is on the way language is used—what words do when people construct and reconstruct them, putting them to various purposes. Wittgenstein uses the word *use* not to suggest that meaning be evaded altogether, but to assert that words have no essential significance outside of the way people apply them to construct and describe ideas. They can be deployed in ways that are separate from their dictionary definitions. He claims that people are always remaking meanings, that meaning is unstable. It is not superfluous, but up for grabs—shaped by people, and by context. The specific set of circumstances surrounding a word as it is spoken—questions of who is speaking, why, to whom, and where—are integral to understanding what the word might mean in relation to the way it is being deployed.

These kinds of circumstances are equally important when considering artworks. For *Untitled 1992 (Free)*, Tiravanija removed the office, and the dealer, from the gallery. The work was a clear challenge to the space’s conventional operation. Tiravanija’s pieces do not simply provide a service within the gallery but challenge its economy. They do not evade meaning but allow for new kinds of meaning to be produced. Viewers not only look at this work for what it can give them—a warm meal—but also for how it can change their perceptions of the way they move through a particular set of relationships within a specific space.
Art has the ability not only to inspire, but also to conspire. When the simplistic logic of cause and effect is undermined, even on a small, individual scale, it can, in Rancière’s words, “change the partition of the spheres of experience.” A work that functions aesthetically makes the making present in viewing visible. It performs a displacement, a structural shift in the visible that disrupts the prevailing hierarchy between maker and producer. When we consider a work aesthetically, we look for the breadth of possibilities it allows, how open it is to reflective rearrangement. We resist slotting artworks into easy categories, and instead look for ways of thinking about our relations to artworks and to one another without predetermining what these might look like, without mending the gaps that allow for movement.

Instead of policing boundaries, we should be trying to expand the language with which we discuss the social in art so that we can become more able to see it, more prepared to understand the particular and varied kinds of relations present when a public gathers around an artwork. The aim here is not to create a new standard of judgment, to define what art is or what it should do. It is to resist narrowing the field of socially engaged art into a set of simple interpersonal relationships. Artworks propose worlds that are more or less open, that invite their publics to co-construct them to greater and lesser degrees. They can function as metonyms in which the activity always present inside and outside the gallery is reproduced, made visible, and sometimes rendered changeable. When a work functions aesthetically, it co-constructs blanks in conversation with its public. It does not aim to fill them, to rest in a set of presumed effects. It proposes a world in which everything is rendered changeable. We should strive for the same in visual criticism: to coproduce an open space, rather than a rubric, for interpretation and reinterpretation.
Notes


3. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., 12.


17. Ibid., 17.

18. In “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics,” Claire Bishop argues that there is a need for a more critical examination of institutional context in regard to relational practice.


22. Ibid.
